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ABSTRACT 
Collaboration is a critical component of homeland security.  During the 2002 
Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, 11,000 public safety officers came together 
from federal, state and local agencies and successfully protected the Olympic Games.  
This collaboration ensured the safety of more than 3.5 million visitors to the state, 
including athletes and foreign dignitaries.  Six years after the Games and the 9/11 terror 
attacks, however, law enforcement agencies at every level have, at times, struggled to 
successfully implement collaborations on a continuing and consistent basis.   
Creating collaborations that endure is an important issue for public safety 
organizations.  What are the key factors or enablers that foster an environment in which 
collaborations can be sustained?  Based on twenty-two interviews with law enforcement 
leaders involved in the 2002 Winter Olympics, several factors were identified that impact 
the effectiveness and endurance of collaborations.  These factors include motivation, felt 
need, leadership, trust and social capital, and a formalized system of roles and 
procedures.  Leaders play an important role in a collaborative effort.  By implementing a 
strategic plan, for example, leaders can increase the level of motivation for collaboration, 
even if there is no immediate need for a collaborative effort.  This study found that 
enablers for continued collaborations after the 2002 Winter Olympics included 
leadership, trust and social capital, and felt need.  The major explanations for the 
discontinuation of other Olympic collaborations were lack of motivation or need, lack of 
leadership, lack of strategic planning and no mandated system.   
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In the past six years, local, state and federal agencies have, at times, struggled to 
successfully implement collaboration on a continuing and consistent basis. Without 
collaboration the ability to properly deal with the necessary Homeland Security 
requirements can be diminished.1  Following the 2001 terrorist attacks on our country, the 
Department of Homeland Security began to encourage and direct agencies to collaborate.  
Six years later, many agencies do not collaborate, nor do they have plans to do so.2    As 
a result, some agencies may find themselves at a major disadvantage during crisis.  On 
the other hand, agencies that do collaborate may experience more successful outcomes 
during major events.   
Collaboration is a critical component of Homeland Security.  When agencies fail 
to plan, practice and implement collaborative efforts, chaos can occur.  Take for example 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  Clearly an emergency response failure in the 
eye of the public, Katrina was an unfortunate example of how first responders struggle to 
effectively collaborate with their partners on a local, regional and state level.3  This 
failure resulted in deaths, property damage and the unnecessary wasting of resources.4 
The inadequate response to Katrina should serve as catalyst for all agencies to implement 
and sustain effective collaborations.5 
Money is being poured into state and local governments to enhance collaborative 
efforts.  Homeland Security grants are distributed to established regional capabilities that 
                                                 
1 William V. Pelfrey, “The Cycle of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework to Prepare for Terrorist 
Threats,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 2, no. 1 (2005): 7.  
2 Robert Flowers (former Commissioner of Utah Department of Public Safety), interviewed by author 
Nov. 2006, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3 Susan Page Hocevar, Gail Fann Thomas and Erik Jansen, “Building Collaborative Capacities: An 
Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness,” Innovations through Collaboration, Advances in 
Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams 12 (2006): 3. 
4 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington D.C.: 




enhance prevention and response.  These capabilities are founded on the concept that 
local first responders need to establish collaborative networks to prevent and respond to 
Homeland Security issues.  With so much money being spent to prepare and respond to 
Homeland Security issues, it is important to have a better understanding of what 
motivates collaborations to endure, or why, after initial success, they disband.  By 
examining collaborative efforts that were utilized in the 2002 Winter Olympics we may 
be able to identify why some collaborative efforts endure while others do not. 
During the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, 11,000 public safety 
officers came together from federal, state and local agencies and successfully protected 
the Games.  The security efforts ensured the safety of more than 3.5 million visitors to the 
area, including athletes and foreign dignitaries.6  To accomplish this monumental goal, 
working groups were established for specific functional operations.  Examples of these 
groups were aviation, media relations, training, tactical, intelligence, emergency 
management, explosives, fire and dignitary protection.  These groups were formed during 
the planning stage and evolved into the operational stage during the Games.  These 
groups were comprised of several different organizations combining their resources into a 
collaborative effort to protect the Games.7  Because there were no major incidents, and 
criminal activity within the area did not increase, this endeavor was considered to be a 
huge accomplishment.8  These collaborative groups achieved success by working 
together productively.   
In spite of the success of these collaborative groups, most did not endure 
following the Games.  In fact, all but two of them ended immediately after the Games.   
One example of a collaboration that did not endure was the Public Order Unit (POU) or 
Crowd Management Unit.  This unit was organized to respond to large disruptions 
involving mass gatherings.  There were four agencies that provided full-time teams 
consisting of thirty to seventy members.  These teams worked and trained collaboratively 
                                                 
6 Aaron Kennard, “Salt Lake Winter Olympics a resounding success,” Sheriff (Alexandria, VA: 
National Sheriff’s Association, 2002), 28. 
7 The Oquirrh Institute, The 2002 Olympic Winter Games Security Lessons Applied to Homeland 
Security (Salt Lake City, UT: 2002).   
8 Kennard, “Salt Lake Winter Olympics a resounding success,” 28. 
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before and during the Winter Olympics.  According to public safety leaders, these teams 
were going to continue operating after the Games.9  Equipment was retained by the 
agencies and paid for by the federal government for the purpose of continuing 
collaborative operations.  Unfortunately, these groups have stopped functioning at all of 
the agencies.  This was an example of a collaborative effort that completely ended shortly 
after the Games. 
Two collaborative groups continued on a full- or part-time basis.  The Olympic 
Joint Information Center (JIC) is an example of a system or process of collaboration that 
local public safety participants (Public Information Officers, PIO) decided to continue.  It 
was determined that the JIC was not needed on a full-time basis.  If, however, a public 
safety agency became involved with a large-scale operation, the PIOs from several 
different agencies would assemble and create a temporary joint information center to 
support the primary agency.  This would afford the primary agency the maximum trained 
resources to address public information issues.  By assembling these professionals from 
around the valley, a primary agency would not have to dedicate resources, especially 
untrained resources, to address the media and handle the distribution of information.   
The JIC collaborated after the Games in 2002 during the kidnapping of Salt Lake 
City teenager Elizabeth Smart.  The JIC also collaborated in 2003 upon her return. The 
Salt Lake City Police Department needed support during those incidents and its leaders 
were aware of the benefits of the JIC.  During these events the JIC was pulled together on 
an ad hoc basis and worked effectively.  However, a similar attempt to collaborate after a 
2007 mall shooting did not work.  To this day the collaborative efforts of the JIC have not 
been reinstated.     
Another example of a collaborative unit that endured after the Games was the 
Olympic Intelligence Unit.  The Intelligence Unit worked in a collaborative effort 
involving federal, state and local law enforcement agencies as well as other disciplines, 
such as the local fire departments.  Following the Winter Olympics, this Intelligence Unit 
continued in the form of the Utah Criminal Intelligence Center (UCIC) and the FBI Joint 
                                                 
9 Mitch McKee (former Captain of Utah Homeland Security), interviewed by author Nov. 2006, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
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Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).  Most of the contributing agencies that collaborated during 
the Olympics recognized that there was a need for this effort to endure.  These agencies 
have remained involved on either a full- time or part- time basis.   
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The central question is:  
What are the factors that explain why some of the successful collaborations used 
during the 2002 Winter Olympics endured and some did not after the end of the 
Olympics?   
B. PRIOR RESEARCH  
There is limited research that examines how collaborations occur and endure.  To 
address the study of collaborations and fill gaps and in an effort to enhance Homeland 
Security, sources of information on collaboration were examined.  The focus was 
literature published since the tragic events of 9/11 when federal officials announced the 
need for government organizations (local, state, federal) to work more closely together in 
all aspects of their missions.  
According to William Pelfrey, collaboration is one of the two most important 
elements in prevention.10  Collaboration is the first element in the “cycle of 
preparedness.”  Collaboration leads to threat recognition, risk management, intervention, 
awareness response, mitigation and finally, recovery.  When collaboration has been 
instituted, key practices such as information sharing are easier to initiate.  When 
collaborative efforts are established during the preparedness stage, the likelihood for 
successful cooperative efforts during an event is increased.  To some it may appear 
obvious that collaboration is a necessity.  However, history shows preparedness and 
collaboration do not always happen.    
                                                 
10 Pelfrey, “The Cycle of Preparedness,” 3.  
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C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
One element of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (September 2006) 
is an effort to promote a sense of “jointness.”  When appropriate, agencies should work 
together in joint operations and exchange not only information and ideas, but also 
exchange resources.11   Collaborative relationships are necessary in situations where 
there is a need for multiple organizations to function together because of capabilities or 
related duties.  However, these collaborations do not appear overnight or materialize 
without effort.12    
By examining the 2002 Winter Olympics and specifically the collaborative efforts 
that made it a success, the intent of this thesis is to identify key factors or enablers for 
collaboration.  The goal is to improve and enhance the Homeland Security community’s 
ability to create collaborations that endure.  This research could also improve the ability 
of multiple public safety agencies and associated agencies (health department, private 
sector) to collaborate.   
D. METHODOLOGY 
The primary method used to gather data for this thesis was retrospective 
interviews with key law enforcement leaders who were directly involved with the 
collaborative efforts initiated for the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics.  During these 
interviews, factors that enabled collaboration as well as barriers to collaborative 
endurance were discussed.  Interviewees were asked to consider specific collaborative 
groups and identify factors that contributed to the success, continuation or end of specific 
collaborative efforts following the Games.  The interviewees addressed factors that  
helped to establish the inter-agency or inter-organizational collaborative efforts.  The 
subjects were asked about collaborative efforts they had both a first-hand and general 
knowledge of during the Games.   
                                                 
11 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), 21. 
12 James W. Buehler, Ellen A. Whitney and Ruth L. Berkelman,.“Business and public health 
collaboration for emergency preparedness in Georgia: a case study,” BMC Public Health 6, Nov. 20, 2006. 
Accessed September, 21, 2007. http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1676007. 
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The interview portion of this thesis used questions and guidelines based on the 
“Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity in an Interagency Context” by Dr. 
Gail F. Thomas, Dr. Susan P. Hocevar and Dr. Erik Jansen from the Naval Postgraduate 
School, September 2006, and other recent literature.  The interviews consisted of open-ended 
questions that rated the collaborative capacities that were present before, during and after the 
Winter Olympics.  The author conducted the interviews.  Twenty-two key leaders who were 
involved in collaborative efforts during the Games were interviewed.  These key leaders were 
employed by federal, state and local law enforcement agencies at the time of the Games.   
Once the research interviews were completed, evaluations on the results were done to 
identify themes that contributed to the maintenance of some collaborations and the 
discontinuation of others.  Using the data collected during the interviews, themes and sub-
themes were identified.  The expectation was to discover a means to improve collaborative 
endeavors in the future, so the lessons learned and knowledge gained would not be lost.   
E. SUMMARY 
The Winter Olympics were considered a collaborative success for the state of Utah, 
the United States, international athletic communities, and the world.  Using the Games as a 
basis, the author interviewed twenty-two key law enforcement leaders who participated in 
collaborative efforts during the Games to discover why some of the efforts endured and why 
most did not.  Although research is limited, federal reports and current literature indicated 
that collaboration improves public safety.   
In the second chapter the author examines prior research, preliminary interviews and 
published literature on what the value of collaboration may be.  This includes the benefits of 
collaboration and the barriers to collaboration endurance.  In the third chapter the author 
explains in greater depth the methodology used to gather data for this thesis. This included 
the use of retrospective interviews of leaders involved in the Games and the limitations of the 
study.  Chapter IV reviews the findings of the twenty-two interviews that were conducted.  In 
Chapter V the author summarizes the results, discusses the findings, relates them to the 
existing literature and makes recommendations based on this study and other literature.   
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II. BACKGROUND / LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND  
“A model for the nation” was a quote of then-Homeland Security Director Tom 
Ridge as he described the 2002 Winter Olympics security collaboration for protecting the 
Games.  Utah’s Governor at the time, Mike Leavitt, commented that the safeguards put in 
place by the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command (UOPSC) “not only met the 
international standards, we exceeded them and set new ones.”13  In addition, Christopher 
Bellavita, Ph.D., who worked directly on the planning of the public safety efforts, 
described the 2002 Winter Olympics in a 2007 article as a “best practice” for major 
events.14 
In June of 1995, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced that Salt 
Lake City, Utah, would host the 2002 Winter Olympics.  Immediately, the planners 
began to tackle the overwhelming need for public safety to protect the Games.15  It would 
require more than eleven thousand law enforcement personnel to protect the more than 
thirty-five hundred participants, representing eighty nations and more than 3.5 million 
visitors and spectators.  Add to that the millions of television viewers around the world 
who would be watching, and the importance of a protected and successful Games became 
imperative to planners.  It was apparent that no single law enforcement organization 
could accomplish this task alone.  State leaders recognized that the required specialties, 
resources and logistics could not be produced by one agency.   
 
                                                 
13 Derek Jensen, “Oly Security effort ‘model for nation.” Deseret News, March 9, 2002. Accessed 
June 27, 2007, http://deseretnews.com/oly/view/0,3949,70001837,00.html. 
14 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: A Strategic Logic of Special Events,” 
Homeland Security Affairs 3, no. 3 (2007). Accessed Sept. 28, 2007, http://www.hsaj.org/?article=3.3.1. 
15 Dale L. Watson (Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, FBI), “The 2002 Olympics-
Cooperation Between Federal, State, Local and Private Agencies to Address Public Safety Concerns,” 
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, May 31, 2001. Accessed June 27, 2007. 
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/watson053101.htm. 
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1. Mandated System for Olympic Collaboration 
During the 1998 General Session of the Utah State Legislature, lawmakers 
proposed legislation to mandated that leaders from various agencies work together for 
Olympic security purposes.  Utah lawmakers approved the measure that formed the Utah 
Olympic Public Safety Command (UOPSC).  Utah Senate Bill 159, Government 
Relationships to Olympics, became part of the Utah Code.16  Under this mandated 
system, Utah lawmakers outlined a structure of roles and procedures for how security 
agencies would work together.   Lawmakers directed members to be flexible enough to 
“promote the effective, efficient and cooperative implementation of the plan and the 
preservation of public safety.”17  The Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public 
Safety was appointed as the chairman.  Federal, state, regional and local agencies selected 
representatives who became voting members of the command.  As required under the 
law, a majority of the members represented law enforcement organizations, such as the 
FBI, county sheriff offices and police departments.  This group established and 
implemented a plan, and they developed policies for Olympic security.   
The law was passed four years before the 2002 Winter Olympics. It required 
agencies from many levels of government and disciplines to collaborate in specialized 
groups in order to operate with a single objective: keeping the Winter Games safe and 
secure.  The overall collaborative effort was made up of multiple sub-units including 
intelligence, public order, investigations, media (Joint Information Center), a terrorism 
task force, bomb detection, aviation, training, emergency management, fire protection, 
dignitary protection, surveillance, site security and administrative command.  This was 
described as “an unprecedented level of cooperation” among the multiple law 
enforcement agencies and the numerous disciplines involved in this event.18   
                                                 
16 State Olympic Public Safety Command Act (February 6, 1998), Utah Code Annotated sec. 53-10-
101 (Alarik Myrin). Accessed March 8, 2008, 
http://www.le.state.ut.us/~1998/htmdoc/sbillhtm/SB0159S1.htm.  
17 1998 Utah State Legislature Session, “Governments Relationship to Olympics,” Senate Bill 159, 
Accessed March 8, 2008, http://www.le.state.ut.us/~1998/htmdoc/sbillhtm/SB0159S1.htm.  
18  Watson, Congressional testimony, 2001. 
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In the aftermath, the Games were described as a tremendous success with regard 
to public safety.  In a 2002 article written by Salt Lake County Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard, 
he stated that the success of a safe Winter Olympics was the result of the combined 
efforts of more than ten thousand public safety officers.  By combining more than sixty 
different agencies under a single command, resources were efficiently deployed.  This 
organized public safety group that functioned under the Utah Olympic Public Safety 
Command was the ultimate collaboration in public safety resources.19  Sheriff Kennard 
was considered to be an important law enforcement leader in the Winter Games, and the 
majority of the sporting venues were located in his jurisdiction.  For these reasons 
Kennard’s report may appear to some to be skewed.  However, the Oquirrh Institute, a 
Utah think-tank dedicated to analyzing public policy and recommending new models of 
governance, also examined the lessons learned during the Winter Olympics.   In a report 
issued by the institute after the Games, the authors praised the use of combined resources 
and the strategy of working under a specific authority.   
This accomplishment can be traced back to the planning stages where operational 
groups were formed and preparation began via the hard work of multiple agencies.20  
One such example was the Intelligence unit.  This unit was created several months before 
the 9/11 terrorist attack and included federal, state and local law enforcement personnel.  
During an interview conducted in preparation for this study, Salt Lake County Sheriff’s 
Office Captain Jeff Carr commented that when the 9/11 attacks occurred, this group felt it 
had already disseminated, produced and acted upon public safety intelligence, and that 
there would be little, if anything, that could occur during the Olympics that they would 
not be able to handle.21  Carr reported that due to this type of success, there were many 
discussions about how collaborations could endure following the Olympics.  The goal 
was for Utah to be at the forefront in addressing criminal activity and terrorism through 
collaboration.22   
                                                 
19 Kennard, “Salt Lake Winter Olympics a resounding success,” 29. 
20 Oquirrh Institute, 36. 




2. Collaboration Endurance 
Hocevar, Thomas and Jansen defined collaborative capacity as, “the ability of 
organizations to enter into, develop, and sustain inter-organizational systems in pursuit of 
collective outcomes.” 23  The final aspect of this, the ability to sustain collaboration once 
achieved, is defined here as collaboration endurance.  Collaboration endurance is 
important for successfully conducting operations to make the homeland secure.  
Collaboration was cited in the 9/11 Commission Report as a critical component of 
Homeland Security.  The Department of Homeland Security was tasked by this report 
with “promoting multi-jurisdictional mutual assistance compacts” in an effort to enhance 
the response of public safety organizations.24  
According to interviews conducted by the author prior to this thesis, most of the 
Olympic collaborations did not endure after the Games.  In 2006, the author interviewed 
four Olympic leaders for insights on why collaborations ended.  During those interviews 
one former Winter Olympic commander expressed concern about why such 
collaborations did not endure and indicated that the lack of a strategic, long-term vision 
of individual leaders within public safety agencies created a barrier to collaboration 
endurance.  
A review of the literature found little research on collaboration endurance.  The 
author did find two noteworthy reports that addressed collaboration.  These are reviewed 
later in this chapter.  Because of the lack of research on collaboration endurance, the 
author focused on analyzing success factors and identifying barriers to understand the 
development of collaborations and explain why collaborative efforts may falter or endure.  
B. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS OF COLLABORATION   
In “Building Collaborative Capacities: An Innovative Strategy for Homeland 
Security Preparedness,” by Hocevar, Thomas and Jansen, and their subsequent report “A 
Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity in an Interagency Context,” the 
                                                 
23 Hocevar et al., “Building Collaborative Capacities, 3. 
24 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., n.d.), 397.   
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authors identified factors that enable and factors that hinder collaboration.25  The first 
report highlighted, through self-reported critical incidents, various success factors and 
barriers.  Barriers are discussed later in this chapter.  In Figure 1 below, the reported 
factors and components for success are adapted from Hocevar et al. (2006).26  These 
authors collected data for their reports from professionals who were working in the 
homeland security field.  Some of these major organizational factors included purpose 
and strategy, structure, lateral mechanisms, incentives and people.  Within each of these 
categories, they identified sub-factors that impacted successful collaboration.  Some of 
these included:  felt need, mandated system, trust, leadership and social capital, which are 
described in more detail below. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Success Factors: Specific Factors and Sub-Factors Identified by Hocevar, 
Thomas and Jansen (2006). 
1. Felt Need 
Hocevar et al. stated that felt need is motivated by a “common goal” or 
“perceived risk” that is shared by different groups.27  A 2005 General Accountability 
Office (GAO) report on enhancing sustainable collaboration also cited the importance of 
                                                 
25 Hocevar et al., “Building Collaborative Capacities,” 6.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 8. 
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need in collaboration.  The report defined felt need as a compelling reason for several 
different organizations to work together in an interdependent effort.  The report also 
stated that organizations could be legislated to work together.  In either situation, a need 
or motivation should to be present.28  When a major event happens in a community, there 
will be a necessity for several different public safety organizations to come together and 
unite their limited assets to successfully prevail over the situation.29  These events do not 
have to be pre-planned like the 2002 Winter Olympics.  According to a Bureau of Justice 
Assistance report, these events not only include major situations, but also routine criminal 
activities that occur on a daily basis.30  
2. Trust  
Forming collaborative efforts requires a certain level of trust.  Trust is defined as 
having “confidence” in other people or organizations.31  Under the “People” component 
of their model of collaborative capacity, Thomas, Hocevar and Jansen highlighted trust as 
an important relationship for key people to build.  In addition, when the Office for 
Domestic Preparedness published a strategy for the prevention of terrorism in 2003, it 
discussed trust as a very important factor for building collaborations.32  When trust is 
present between two individuals or organizations, conflict and discussions can be handled 
                                                 
28 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Results-Oriented Government Practices That Can Help 
Enhance and Sustain Collaborations among Federal Agencies, GAO 06-15 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2005), 11. 
29 Michael Grossman (Captain, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department), “First Responders: How 
States, Localities and the Federal Government are Working Together to Make America Safer,” testimony 
before the U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Homeland Security, July 17, 2003. 
Accessed December 15, 2007, www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/2003_h/030717-
grossman.doc. 
30 Phil Linn and the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Mutual Aid: Multijurisdictional 
Partnerships for Meeting Regional Threats, NCJ 210679 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, 2005), 1. 
31 Stephen M. R. Covey, The Speed of Trust (New York, New York: Free Press, 2006), 5. 
32U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The Office for Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for 
Homeland Security, Prevention and Deterrence, June 2003.    
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more efficiently and with less tension.33  An important benefit of trust is that 
collaboration endurance is enhanced when the key stakeholders do not feel threatened or 
in conflict with others who are directly involved.  Seemingly, when conflicts are avoided 
or easily resolved, collaborations can function more beneficially for all concerned.34  
Bellavita reported in a recent Homeland Security Journal article that when members of 
several organizations work, plan and even socialize together, building relationships and 
trust is more easily accomplished and the collaborative operation can be realized.35  
What if there is no time to develop trust before an event?  If trust has not been 
established prior to a significant event, something referred to as “swift trust” becomes 
important.  According to author Terry Alder in an article published in the Journal of 
Business Strategy, “swift trust” can be achieved during high-crisis events, such as 
disasters or terrorist attacks, when the need factor is high.36  When groups are forced to 
work together because of a high-priority assignment, they will draw together 
interdependently as a team to undertake the complex job.  Trust is essential to effective 
collaborations.  According to Department of Homeland Security guidelines, trust is an 
initial step toward developing effective relationships and social capital.37   
3. Social Capital 
Trust will lead to the development of social capital between people and groups.38  
Social capital is based in relationships that develop where trust, openness and consistency 
                                                 
33 Akbar Zaheer, Bill McEvily and Vincenzo Perrone, “Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of 
Interorganizational and Interpersonal Trust on Performance,” Organizational Science 9, no. 2 (1998): 144. 
Accessed December 12, 2007, 
http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=117&sid=5e09e3c3-8296-4158-8943-
4439bb579cc0%40sessionmgr109. 
34 Naim Kapucu, “Interorganizational Coordination in Dynamic Context: Networks in Emergency 
Response Management,” Connections 26, no. 2 (2005): 35. Accessed Nov. 2, 2007, 
http://www.insna.org/Connections-Web/Volume26-2/4.Kapucu.pdf.  
35 Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security,” 13. 
36 Terry R. Adler, “Swift Trust and Distrust in Strategic Partnering Relationships: Key Considerations 
of Team-Based Designs,” Journal of Business Strategy 24, no. 2105.  Accessed January 12, 2008, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=1399533111&SrchMode=1&sid=1&fmt. 
37 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness Guidelines, 8.  
38 Ibid. 
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between individuals or organizations exist.  Hocevar et al. discussed social capital as a 
noteworthy factor in collaborative efforts and cited a homeland security professional who 
said, “Collaboration is attained through a personal touch, a handshake and a smile.”39  
Social capital is cited in the literature as an important factor that helps leaders in 
collaborative efforts work closer during the actual operation.40  Social capital between 
individuals from different organizations contributes to a more cooperative experience in 
collaborations.  In other words, social capital is an important factor that facilitates 
bringing people together.41  In addition, it assists in solving problems through 
cooperative input of all parties involved.  It creates a network of people working 
collectively to solve problems that can be important in collaborative efforts.42    
4. Leadership 
“Forging new partnerships while strengthening existing ones may be the single 
most important element leaders can offer their agencies.”43  This is according to Captain 
Kenneth Berkowitz of the Canton, Massachusetts, Police Department in his article 
published in the FBI Bulletin.  In that article, Berkowitz stated that interagency efforts are 
the only way to prevent future domestic terrorist attacks.  The best way to put a stop to 
terrorism within the United States is by public safety organizations working together with 
citizens.44   
Thomas et al. described the importance of leadership’s commitment to 
collaboration.  “A leader who clearly expresses commitment to a vision of collaboration 
with other agencies can provide an important incentive for other organizational members 
to engage in this ‘new’ activity.”45    
                                                 
39 Hocevar et al., “Building Collaborative Capacities, 17. 
40 Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security.” 
41 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Results-Oriented Government Practices,” 19.   
42 Kapucu, “Interorganizational Coordination,” 38.  
43 Kenneth N. Berkowitz, “The Benefits of Effective Partnerships,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 76, 
12 (December, 2007): 5.   
44 Ibid.   
45 Thomas et al., “A Diagnostic Approach,” 8. 
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A 2005 GAO report identified leadership’s commitment to a multi-organizational 
effort as critical.46  Leaders must have insight and good decision-making abilities to 
assign the right people to collaborative tasks.  Finally, leaders need to possess the 
capacity to work through changes in organizations involved in collaborations.47  Having 
the appropriate leadership style is essential.  A team orientation and facilitation skills are 
traits that can assist in enhancing the quality of collaborations and not suppress others 
involved.48 
5. Mandated System 
Hocevar et al. identified formalized processes as an important structural factor for 
successful collaboration.49  They described other structural factors, such as “interagency 
committees” and “dedicated assets (people, resources),” as contributing to successful 
collaborations.  They write that “successful interagency collaborations had formalized 
coordination of liaison roles.”50  All of these factors were either specifically addressed or 
generally intended by the legislative mandate for the Utah Olympics and are, together, 
referred to in the remainder of this thesis as a mandated system.  Although the author 
found limited literature on factors related to collaboration endurance, two reports 
specifically address the use of a mandated system.  The reports described how, through 
mandates, organizations achieve sustainable collaborations.   
First, a GAO report suggested that a good way to create endurance was to pass 
laws requiring different organizations to work together.  The report cited an example of 
how a legislated system for collaboration was successful.  In 1995, a Federal Wildland 
Fire Policy was developed for the Department of Interior and the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA).  This federal directive was in response to critical 
                                                 
46 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Results-Oriented Government Practices, 17. 
47 James W. Broyles et al., “C2 Experimentation, Avoiding Lessons Re-Learned in Collaboration 
Experimentation” (paper presented at the 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology 
Symposium, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego). Accessed January 6, 2008, 
http://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dod/nps16-072505-13.pdf. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Hocevar et al., “Building Collaborative Capacities,” 14. 
50 Thomas et al., “A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity,” 7. 
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national incidents.  During the 1995 fire season, thirty-four people died while fighting 
fires.  The directive was adopted to reduce the risks associated with fighting wildland 
fires.  According to this report, the directive mandated that federal fire services and their 
federal, state and local partners work in a collaborative effort to battle wildland fires.51  
The same GAO report also addressed a mandated system between the Veterans 
Administration and the Department of Defense Health Care Resources Sharing.  The 
collaboration was designed “to more effectively and efficiently use federal health 
resources.”52  Both of these mandated systems allowed different organizations with 
separate “missions, cultures and established ways” to work together to provide a better 
outcome for all involved.53 
Finally, another federal report suggested that collaboration can be 
“institutionalized through formal agreements.”54  A 2003 National Institute of Justice 
(NIJ) report encouraged that these types of agreements be formulated to help in the 
development of task forces and multi-organizational undertakings.    
C. BARRIERS / CHALLENGES TO COLLABORATION 
Existing literature suggests that some of the factors mentioned above may not be 
easy to achieve.  In fact, there could be multiple barriers to successful collaborations.  
Hocevar et al. identified barriers to collaboration that are illustrated in Figure 2.  For 
organizations to have successful collaborations, they must create a capacity where 
enablers for collaboration overcome the barriers to collaboration.55  The findings and 
information by Hocevar et al. provided important background used in this study to 
investigate barriers to collaboration after the Winter Olympics.  Subcomponent barrier 
factors adapted from their research are outlined below; they include lack of trust, lack of 
                                                 
51 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Results-Oriented Government Practices, 8. 
52 Ibid, 9.  
53 Ibid, 1.  
54 Malcolm L. Russell-Einhorn, “Fighting Urban Crime: The Evolution of Federal-Local 
Collaborations,” Research in Brief, NCJ 197040 (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2003): 3. 
55 Thomas et al., “A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity,” 5. 
 17
social capital, lack of leadership, lack of formal roles / mandated systems and lack of 
planning.56  These sub-factors are discussed in more detail below. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Barriers to Collaboration:  Factors and Sub-Factors Identified by Hocevar, 
Thomas and Jansen (2006). 
 
1. Lack of Trust / Lack of Social Capital 
Lack of trust and lack of social capital were combined for purposes of this review 
because both are embedded in social relationships.  The literature states that a key 
component of effective collaboration is relationships.57  Trust is a primary factor in 
developing these relationships and building social capital.  Hocevar et al. noted that when 
people and their organizations do not have trust, relationships have difficulty forming, 
and “building collaborative capacity” is a challenge.58  Organizations and their  
 
                                                 
56 Hocevar et al, “Building Collaborative Capacities,” 11. 
57 Tammy A. Rinehart, Anna T. Laszlo and Gwen O. Briscoe, COPS Collaboration Toolkit: How to 
Build, Fix and Sustain Productive Partnerships (Washington, D.C.: Office Of Community Oriented Police 
Services, U.S. Department of Justice, 2001), 6. Accessed March 9, 2007, 
www.hsdl.org/homsec/docs.justice/nps18-053105-07.pdf. 
58 Hocevar et al, “Building Collaborative Capacities,” 10. 
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employees want to ensure that they are not taken advantage of during collaborative 
situations.  There can be a natural suspicion toward other organizations that may have 
been competitors.59   
In an article published in Organizational Science, Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 
stated that when there is no trust, stakeholders avoid risks and fail to plan appropriately 
throughout their collaborations.60  Unfortunately, agencies tend to compete against each 
other instead of working together in shared activities.61  When teams or groups do not 
trust one another, poor information sharing, inadequate communication and lack of 
critical thinking could occur, and can be devastating to a collaborative effort.62 
It is more difficult to achieve trust and social capital when organizations that have 
never worked together are networked to produce an output.   A lack of social capital 
could mean one agency would be denied access to another’s resources.63  A lack of trust 
could result in an ineffective response.  Trusting relationships and rapport need to be 
established in advance of when they might be needed.64  “When the drum beats for battle, 
it’s too late to sharpen the sword.”65  
2. Lack of Leadership 
Hocevar et al. pointed to competition and territorialism between organizations as 
barriers to effective collaboration.  Collaborations are more likely to be successful when 
leaders have the ability to direct the paths of their organizations and to rise above 
                                                 
59 Kapucu, “Interorganizational Coordination,” 35.  
60 Zaheer et al., “Does Trust Matter?” 144.  
61 Jane Fedorowicz, Janis L. Gogan and Christine B. Williams, “The E-Government Collaboration 
Challenge: Lessons from Five Case Studies,” Networks and Partnership Series (Washington, D.C.: IBM 
Center for the Business of Government, 2006), 17. Accessed December 10, 2007, 
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/FedorowiczReport.pdf.  
62 David Noble, “Knowledge Foundation of Effective Collaboration” (paper presented at the 9th 
International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, 9th International Command 
and Control Research and Technology Symposium, 3. Accessed January 3, 2008, 
http://www.dodccrp.org/events/9th_ICCRTS/CD/papers/110.pdf. 
63 Kapucu, “Interorganizational Coordination,” 38.  
64 Berkowitz, “The Benefits of Effective Partnerships,” 5.   
65 Ibid. 
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barriers.66  In addition, research noted that a lack of support or commitment to 
collaboration on the part of leaders can create a significant barrier.  Leaders who are 
committed to collaborative efforts engage in strategic planning and develop a common 
vision with other stakeholders in the group.67  Former Utah Department of Public Safety 
Commissioner, Robert L. Flowers, wrote about attempts for public safety collaboration 
within the State of Utah in his Naval Postgraduate School thesis “Strategies to Build a 
Trusted and Collaborative Information Sharing System for State Level Homeland 
Activities.”  Commissioner Flowers addressed lack of leadership as a key barrier to 
collaboration.  He concluded that leadership is the key to changing barrier beliefs.  He 
described ways in which leaders can overcome challenges to collaboration while 
acknowledging these may be politically difficult to accomplish.  With good leadership, he 
argued, a new culture can be rebuilt, creating a political environment where trust is 
“widespread,” collaboration is “routine” and communication is “robust.”  This is echoed 
in a 2005 GAO report on sustained collaborations.  Leadership was mentioned as a 
required building block for collaborations.  Without it, collaborations will be impeded.68 
It is important to recognize that leadership characteristics may not be the sole 
explanation for why collaborations may or may not endure.  However, without effective 
leadership, things are more likely to remain unchanged and enduring collaboration will 
be more difficult to achieve.69  
3. Lack of Formal Roles / No Mandated System 
When collaborative participants do not have the authority or ability to act within 
their collaborative endeavor because of lack of formal roles, then barriers are created. 
Although in Hocevar et al. this component is mentioned less often by research 
participants, it is an important factor in speaking to challenges.70  Unfortunately many 
                                                 
66 Hocevar et al., “Building Collaborative Capacities,  255-274. 
67Ibid.,  6.  
68 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Results-Oriented Government Practices, 11.  
69 Robert L. Flowers, “Strategies to Build a Trusted and Collaborative Information Sharing System for 
State Level Homeland Activities,” Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. June 2004.  
70 Hocevar et al., “Building Collaborative Capacities,” 8. 
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public safety organizations do not collaborate because the institutional norms within the 
agency are to act independently of anyone else.71  Without a written formal agreement or 
mandate, organizations tend to have misunderstandings about procedures, authority 
relations and roles that cause ineffective operations.  In addition, the ineffective 
operations may cause conflicts between organizations that could have been easily 
resolved or avoided with a formal system.72   
4. Lack of Planning 
Not looking at collaboration as a long-term strategy can create a barrier to 
collaborative success.  When the focus is only on the individual or their agency and not 
on the “broader set of interests or common goal” then collaboration is hindered.73   
Thomas et al. considered this to be the lack of goal clarity.  The lack of goal clarity can 
lead to the lack of strategic planning.  The importance of planning is addressed as a vital 
aspect of collaboration.74  Not planning or preparing for these endeavors is likely to result 
in failures.  Hurricane Katrina was one example of what can happen when failures occur.  
The City of New Orleans had an ineffective plan to evacuate its residents.  Chaos 
unfolded in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina as floodwaters engulfed neighborhoods 
and left residents stranded.  Multiple organizations had failed to collaborate and focus on 
this potential problem. “The most fundamental problem to plague planning processes is a 




                                                 
71 Linn, Mutual Aid: Multijurisdictional Partnerships, 2. 
72 Ibid., 11.  
73 Thomas et al., “A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity,” 8.   
74 Oquirrh Institute, 36.   
75 Amy K. Donahue and Robert V. Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of 
Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn From Them,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 
2 (2006): 8. Accessed November 12, 2007, https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/edu/nps37-110807-
01.pdf&code=f25471b24dae82fe3f1285cace1970b9. 
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D. SUMMARY  
The Department of Homeland Security, along with local, state and federal public 
safety organizations at all levels of government, has struggled to implement sustainable 
collaborations.  There are breaks and barriers that need to be continuously overcome so 
that useful collaborative efforts can be achieved.76  By reviewing literature on 
collaboration, the author of this study was able to better understand and clarify what 
factors and barriers may exist for collaboration.   
Two studies conducted by Hocevar, Thomas and Jansen outlined factors for, and 
barriers to, collaboration.  The factors for collaboration included felt need, trust, social 
capital and leadership.  Instituting a mandated system can also be an enabler.  Barriers 
included lack of trust, lack of social capital, a lack of leadership, no mandated or formal 
system and lack of planning. 
Using this and other published literature as a basis, a list of questions was 
formulated, compiled, and then presented to twenty-two law enforcement leaders who 
participated in collaborative efforts during the 2002 Winter Olympics.  The goal was to 
identify possible factors or barriers to collaboration endurance.  The following chapter 
will explain the methodology the author used to conduct this study. 
                                                 
76 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can 
Enhance Emergency Preparedness, GAO-04-1009 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004), 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. RESEARCH OVERVIEW  
The research question addressed in this thesis is: What are the factors that explain 
why some of the successful collaborations used during the 2002 Winter Olympics 
endured and some did not?  The goal is to uncover the factors or enablers that increase 
the likelihood for collaboration to continue and to identify factors or barriers that cause 
collaborations to end. 
This chapter discusses the design of this research, the questions that were asked 
while conducting the interviews for this thesis, the interview process, and how interviews 
were analyzed.  In addition, the limitations of this study are presented. 
1. Contributors 
The study of collaboration during the 2002 Winter Olympics included interviews 
with a diverse group of people involved in the Winter Games.  These twenty-two 
individuals had distinct experiences that were germane to this thesis.  These interviewees 
all were considered to be leaders within their law enforcement organizations.  
Specifically, they were assigned to supervisory or management positions within their 
agencies.  They worked for several different public safety organizations, including local, 
state and federal law enforcement agencies.  They all had key roles in the planning, 
implementation and dealing with the aftermath of the Winter Olympics.  The interviewed 
subjects had between twenty and thirty years of law enforcement service.  The subject 
breakdown was: 
• Fourteen local law enforcement (city and county) 
• Five state law enforcement  
• Three federal law enforcement 
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2. Interviews  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with twenty-two key players from 
organizations that participated in the Games in a significant way.  The interviewees, who 
are now considered subject matter experts on the 2002 Olympic Games, were asked to 
share their perspectives on factors that helped establish collaboration, barriers to 
collaboration, and why some collaborative efforts continued and others ended.   Open-
ended questions were asked.  These questions were formulated based on the review of the 
literature that identified possible factors affecting collaboration during the Olympics and 
endurance of collaborations after the Olympics.  The foundation for these questions was 
derived from “A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity in an 
Interagency Context” by Thomas, Hocevar and Jansen.77  Some of the questions posed 
during the interviews addressed aspects that increased collaborative efforts, specific 
examples of collaboration, post-Olympic collaborative efforts and recommendations for 
enhancing collaboration.  The interviews allowed for follow-up questions to help expand, 
probe and isolate answers. 
The interview was divided into two sections.  The interview questions and format 
are attached in Appendix A.  The first set of questions focused on the planning and 
operation of the Games.  The second set of questions addressed what occurred after the 
Games ended.  The questions focused on the following areas:  
1. Specific and/or general Winter Olympic efforts the subject was directly 
involved in during the Games.  
2. Factors the subject believed helped enable successful interagency and inter-
organizational collaborative efforts.  Also, the challenges and barriers to 
collaboration that occurred during the Games. 
 
 
                                                 
77 Thomas et al., “A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity.”  
 25
3. Additional factors were introduced in the interview in the form of probing 
questions.  The probing questions were based on collaboration literature to 
determine whether the following factors were important before, during or after 
the Winter Olympics: 
o Trust 
o Interdependence 
o Social Capital 
o Shared Problem Solving 
o Incentives 
o Leadership 
o Strategic Planning  
o Barriers 





The subjects were encouraged to explain why collaborative units either endured 
or did not endure after the Games, and were encouraged to give examples of any first-
hand or general knowledge they had with regard to collaboration during the Games. 
3. Interview Process 
The interviews were digitally recorded to ensure complete accuracy of the data.  
Interviews lasted between forty and sixty minutes.  To help make the respondents as 
comfortable as possible, the interviews were conducted at their homes, offices or at the 
author’s office.  The interviewee chose the location.  All of the information was 
maintained as confidential.  Information quoted in the thesis is presented as anonymous.  
If the nature of the quote could disclose the respondent’s identity, permission was 
requested before it was used.  By agreeing to keep their responses confidential the 
interviewees were more willing to share their views and experiences. 
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4. Analysis 
The interviews were completely transcribed and a close review conducted.  The 
interviewees’ answers were analyzed and themes were identified that could explain how 
collaborative efforts can be improved and continued.  Following the interviews, the 
transcript information was coded based on several categories.  These were first divided 
into two broad categories: enablers of collaboration and barriers to collaboration.  
Similarities and patterns were noted for the interviewees’ statements.  
Some of the codes that emerged were power, motivation, leadership, trust, 
systems (mandated), need, political, incentives, reputation and right people.  The codes 
were aggregated and summary themes derived based on the literature about collaboration, 
multi-organizational endeavors and factors enhancing collaborative success and 
endurance.   
The findings of these interviews were divided into themes and summary results 
were derived.  The findings then were compared to the recent literature about 
collaboration, both from the private and public sectors.  The goal was to find connections 
between the study and the literature, with the goal of uncovering specific factors that 
enhanced the ability to begin and to continue collaborative efforts. 
B. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
One of the limitations of this study was the size of the sample group that was 
interviewed.  The results may be considered to be from a small sample of the total 
number of leaders who supervised collaborative efforts during the 2002 Olympics.  Also, 
it has been six years since the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics.  The information 
provided by the interviewees constitutes their view of how these collaborative efforts 
occurred.  Information they provided was based on their retrospective view of how they 




C. SUMMARY  
The twenty-two interviewees were considered to be leaders who had key roles 
during the 2002 Winter Olympics.  They were asked to respond to a variety of open-
ended interview questions.  Their interviews were digitally recorded for accuracy.  Their 
answers were analyzed, coded and categorized.  The purpose of this research approach 
was to identify recurring themes for collaboration and collaboration endurance as 
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IV. RESULTS 
A. INTERVIEW FINDINGS 
Taxpayers who are asked to fund homeland security efforts may want to learn 
how often collaborations that have been initially supported have not endured, and why 
they have faltered.  Of the subjects interviewed for this thesis, 100 percent cited such 
failures as a major concern that needs closer study.  This chapter reports the interview 
findings.  These include the factors that the respondents believed enabled successful 
collaborations before, during and after the Winter Olympics, and factors that were viewed 
as challenges and barriers to collaborative efforts.    
1. Enablers for Collaborations 
During the interviews, four main themes emerged.  As outlined in Figure 3, these 
themes included motivation, leadership, trust, and mandated systems, or formalized roles 
and procedures.  For this particular group these themes emerged as key enablers for a 
successful collaboration during the Games.  Eighty-six percent of the respondents made 
statements identified with the theme of social capital as a strong enabler for collaboration 
endurance; 72 percent felt trust enabled good collaborations.  When they discussed 
motivation or need, 81 percent of the respondents considered it to be an important factor.  
Slightly more than half, 55 percent of the interviewees, felt leadership was a strong 
enabler for collaboration.  The same percentage of respondents reported that a mandated 
system was a strong enabler.  Within two of these key enablers or factors, motivation and 
leadership, sub-themes were identified.  Strategic planning, the right people, felt need, 
interdependence and reputation protection were among these enablers.  Respondents 
noted that these sub-themes helped to influence organizations and disciplines to work 




Figure 3.   Enablers: Development and Endurance of Collaboration  
a. Trust and Social Capital 
A notable aspect of the study was that 72 percent of the interviewees 
reported that trust at some level was a strong enabler in collaboration.  Eighty-six percent 
of the respondents said that social capital and relationship building was also a strong 
enabler.  Several respondents emphasized the importance of developing both trust and 
social capital long before a critical incident arises.   
About a third of the subjects reported that trust cannot be developed in the 
middle of a crisis.  One local leader said, “We don’t pass our cards out at a crisis. We 
pass them out before…it’s imperative because if somebody shows up at your door with a 
crisis, how do you know that they know what they’re doing?”78   
A federal leader believed developing the relationships three to four years 
before the Games was critical to understanding how the resources of so many agencies 
would be focused on a single job.79  Three of the leaders who worked in the Joint 
Information Center (JIC) during the Games discussed the importance of trust when 
dealing with sensitive information that affected the decisions of top state and federal 
government leaders.  One JIC leader spoke about the buildup of trust as the Games 
                                                 
78 Anonymous Local Law Enforcement Official B, interviewed by author on Oct. 15, 2007. 
79 Anonymous Federal Law Enforcement Official, interviewed by author on Nov. 11, 2007. 
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approached and how trust was a critical enabler to good collaboration. “When the anthrax 
scare happened, for instance, it was a very close group that knew [about] it at first…as it 
got bigger we didn’t want to let the cat out of the bag too soon and have it in the news 
before we even knew what was going on.  And so I would say trust was a huge factor 
there…you had to know when you talk [to] somebody that they weren’t going to tell their 
husband or wife who might…tell their mother who might…you know what I mean.”80  
A senior public safety leader offered an example of how social capital 
enabled good collaboration.  In this case, it helped to resolve a major difference before 
the Games began.  He used social capital during a meeting with Salt Lake Olympic 
President Mitt Romney.  They were discussing the sensitivity of the magnetometers used 
to screen visitors at venues.  He explained that the sensitivity of these machines could be 
the difference between detecting dangerous and life-threatening objects and letting such 
objects slip through.  However, if the magnetometers were too sensitive, Olympic 
spectators could have been delayed and, as a result, missed events.  This was a critical 
issue that pitted safety against convenience and access.  The interviewee said that if the 
relationship and social capital that he and Romney had already established did not exist, 
these conversations might not have ended with an effective resolution.  
b. Motivation 
Leaders who participated in this study recognized a major motivation early 
on: No one wanted to fail in front of the world.  The task before them was huge; 3.5 
million spectators prepared to witness the 2002 Winter Olympics Games.  It was a world 
event in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 1996 bombing at the Summer 
Olympics in Atlanta.  One federal leader said that the public demanded no less than 
complete cooperation among law enforcement agencies to achieve the task at hand: safe 
and secure Games.81 
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While the consensus among leaders was that protecting the public was a 
major motivator, it is important to note that the majority of interviewees cited three sub-
themes to motivation.  As seen in Figure 3 these sub-themes include felt need, 
interdependence, and reputation protection.   
(1)  Felt Need.  The vast majority of leaders who participated in 
this study indicated that some element of felt need was an important enabler for this 
collaboration.  “I think part of it comes back to…motivation and when the Olympics 
[were] staring us in the face, there was a lot of motivation,” said one local leader.  
Another local official described how the felt need greatly increased 
after the 9/11 attacks.  He described a paradigm shift that occurred following the attacks 
and how it created a greater drive to protect the games.82 A state official remembered 
seeing a PowerPoint presentation during the planning stage in which the first slide said, 
“Those who plan succeed, and we don’t have a choice not to succeed.” He said that slide 
represented the overwhelming need to collaborate.83  A senior federal leader described 
the need this way, “There was no decision to collaborate, in my opinion.  It was as sure as 
the sun rising, you either are going to work jointly or you were not going to be 
successful.”84 
(2)  Interdependence.  A consistent theme that emerged from the 
twenty-two interviewees was agency interdependence.  First, respondents recalled that no 
single agency, whether federal, state or local, could single-handedly protect multiple 
Olympic venues.  Even with unlimited financial resources and personnel, the task would 
require collaboration.  Specialized groups, such as bomb squads, aviation experts and 
intelligence units, also would need support.  One leader remarked during his interview 
that there was no question the need to work together for this cause was high.  He 
commanded one of the largest agencies in Utah and realized early on that his agency 
could not run things, even in his jurisdiction, without the help of outside organizations.  
He said it was a “humbling” feeling to realize how immense this event was and that his 
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organization could not do it all by themselves.85  A senior state official with more than 25 
years experience said that the State of Utah was a community that had a national event 
with a global interest in its backyard, and that no one alone could handle it.  He went on 
to say that if a person or an agency believed they could manage something like the 
Winter Olympics alone, they were “either uneducated or very, very foolish.  Nobody can 
do this alone.”86  One local official addressed the benefit of such interdependence.  He 
worked in the JIC, and noted that by embracing interdependence, JIC members were able 
to look at a problem as a group, which gave them the perspective of not only law 
enforcement personnel, but of those from the medical fields, fire and human services.   
(3)  Reputation Protection. Interestingly, two leaders involved in 
this study acknowledged that there were motivations to protect one’s reputation.  They 
did not want to be caught unprepared or unable to face the challenge.  They candidly 
expressed concerns about the political consequences if the Games were not successful.  
Specifically, they described how a troubled Olympics might have damaged their own 
reputations.  One said, “If we don’t pull this off it’s going to make us all look bad.” 87 
Another leader discussed an example of how deadlines factored in 
during the planning and execution of the Olympics.  If a group or individual was unable 
to finish a project on time, it would delay other projects.  There was tremendous self-
pressure not to be the one who broke the chain.  “There were deadlines.  On this date my 
portfolio will be activated.  It better be prepared or I will look like a bonehead or it will 
fail.”88  Both of these leaders believed that reputation protection effectively enhanced 
collaborative capacity. 
c. Leadership 
With so many organizations participating, it was imperative for the 
leadership of each organization to have a commitment to the mission of keeping the 
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Olympics safe and secure.  Leadership was responsible for keeping their organization 
focused, not only on its individual goals, but also on the objectives of the collaborative 
efforts in which they were participating.  One state official said that without good 
leadership and a clear vision, people tended to get lost.  He added that there was too 
much potential for the “mission to creep” away from cooperation and back to the 
individual organization’s goals.89   
In addition, one mid-level manager from a local agency described how his 
chief allowed him to go out and “make this work” by partnering with multiple other 
agencies.90 The Olympics could only work under the direction of strong leaders who 
were “not insecure about giving up their resources,” said one state leader.91  A top federal 
official insisted that without leadership’s commitment to the collaboration, “You’re 
banging your head against the wall.”92    
(1)  Strategic Planning.  When discussing leadership, 55 percent of 
the participants addressed the value of the strategic planning process.  In the case of the 
2002 Olympics this process began seven years earlier.  The subjects agreed that such 
planning was a crucial part of good collaboration.  “Bright minds had put together a 
plan…the execution of that plan was almost flawless…strategic planning, absolutely 
critical.”  This comment came from a high-level state official.93  During this strategic 
planning process most, if not all, key players and stakeholders were in the room for 
important decisions.  Another state leader explained why this was so critical saying, “One 
of the biggest things about that strategic plan, without the players in the same room it just 
would have been a free-for-all.”94 
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A senior federal law enforcement official stated that one of the 
successful attributes of strategic planning was that roles were defined early in the process.  
This allowed law enforcement to create accountabilities and merge operations.95 
One collaborative Olympic group, which was described by more 
than half as extremely successful during the Games, was the JIC.  The interviewees 
indicated that both formal and informal planning by members of the JIC contributed to 
the success. Three of the twenty-two leaders who were interviewed for this study held 
full-time assignments at the JIC.  One of the highlights they addressed was the strategic 
planning effort that resulted in a “JIC in a box” program.  “We stored all of the 
equipment that we could, all of the supplies that we could, and we put them into what we 
call JIC in a box.”96  The idea was to have portable containers with all the needed 
material that would have enabled them to set up an information center almost anywhere. 
“If there was ever a major incident…we would be able to have things immediately 
available to do a JIC.”97   
(2)  The Right People.  Slightly more than half of the leaders 
interviewed focused on the importance of choosing the right individuals to represent their 
organizations during the Games.  There appeared to be a consensus that they needed to 
pick “the right people.”  A state leader from the JIC said, “I think the right people made 
the system work.” 98  Another local leader added, “I think the heads of agencies made a 
conscious decision to make sure that those people [who] were assigned to do that had 
those skills [interpersonal skills / see the big picture].  I'm not saying they left the stinkers 
back to run the office.” 99   
Several of those leaders who felt the “right people” were important 
discussed how they chose them.  First, they sought out individuals who possessed 
suitable skills, such as people who had the ability to develop relationships, social capital 
                                                 
95 Anonymous Federal Law Enforcement Official, interviewed by author on Nov. 11, 2007. 
96 Anonymous State Law Enforcement Official, interviewed by author on Sept. 25, 2007. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Anonymous State Law Enforcement Official, interviewed by author on Sept. 25, 2007. 
99 Anonymous Local Law Enforcement Official A, interviewed by author on Oct 15, 2007. 
 36
and trust with their colleagues.  It was necessary to appoint those who were capable of 
moving a collaborative effort forward.  This would make working with other 
organizations more effective and successful.  A senior leader involved at the state level 
offered his perspective: “People skills are critical.  I'll tell you, not to give names, but we 
had one individual in Utah [who] was a law enforcement leader and he was [a] knot head, 
wasn’t getting along with anybody, wouldn’t come to the meetings, kept referring to 
everybody invading his county, and it was awful, and I kept trying to reach out to him 
saying, ‘Look, come on, come on board with this’.”100  The interviewee went on to say 
that building relationships and operating collaboratively was a force multiplier to success.  
Having competent and capable leaders in the right places was central to smooth and 
effective operations. 
d. Mandated System 
The interviewees addressed the Utah law that pulled multiple leaders from 
various organizations together for Olympic security.  In 1998, state legislators mandated 
that Olympic public safety efforts collaborate under one umbrella known as the Utah 
Olympic Public Safety Command (UOPSC).  Fifty-five percent of the interviewees 
considered this legislation to be a strong enabler for Olympic collaboration.  One local 
leader indicated that once the Winter Olympics began a system of collaborative roles and 
procedures had been well-defined and that just about anyone could have been placed in a 
position to complete the task.  A mandated system was described by one local leader like 
this:  “It was such a machine at that point and the plan was so far developed that I think 
you could’ve…trained somebody up in a couple weeks.”101   
A local elected official noted how the mandated system evolved: “If I was 
to die and go off the face of the earth tomorrow, the strike force has been ingrained long 
enough…that [the] organizational culture will carry it through.”102  Another local leader 
felt so strongly about this type of a legislative mandate that he said, “If people aren’t 
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mandated, what the hell.”103  Several interviewees agreed that without the mandate, 
collaborations would have been more difficult to achieve.  They also felt that the 
mandated roles, procedures and relationships ensured that when individuals left, 
collaborative efforts were not jeopardized.  A state leader said, “I think at some point, of 
course, the system becomes more important than the relationships.  We have to fall back 
to the system that we had in place when relationships failed.”   
2. Enablers for Post-Olympic Collaboration Endurance  
The author identified two examples of collaborations in which some of the 
enablers illustrated in Figure 4 contributed to the endurance of collaboration following 
the Games.  Figure 4 identifies trust and social capital, motivation and leadership as 
factors for collaboration endurance for the two collaborative groups:  the JIC and the 
Intelligence Unit.  The JIC eventually dissolved.  The Olympic Intelligence Unit blended 
with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and is – at the time of this writing – still 
operating out of the local FBI office.  
 
Figure 4.   Enablers for Post-Olympic Collaboration Endurance for Joint Information 
Center and the Intelligence Unit 
 
a. Joint Information Center 
During the Olympics, the JIC was in charge of all public information 
inquiries and media releases for the Games.  The JIC collaboration consisted of multiple 
law enforcement, fire, health and human services personnel who were assigned to 
different roles. 
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This team of public information officers began its collaboration years 
before the Winter Games.  By the time the athletes arrived in Utah, the JIC plan was 
well-organized and ready to execute.  The unit was prepared to manage and respond to 
the massive volume of media requests that poured into the JIC over the course of the 
Winter Olympics. 
The JIC was such a success, that members implemented plans for 
collaboration endurance, at least on an as-needed basis.  The JIC endured for some time 
after the Winter Games, and was implemented during two specific incidents.  The first 
was the kidnapping of Salt Lake City teenager Elizabeth Smart in 2002.  The second JIC 
operation was in 2005 when the State of Utah set up an emergency shelter to house 
Hurricane Katrina evacuees.  That was the last time the JIC collaborated. 
The JIC eventually discontinued operations after these major post-
Olympic events.  Prior to this, themes of motivation or need, trust and social capital, and 
leadership were identified as the reasons for its endurance after the Games. 
(1)  Trust and Social Capital.  Two of the key themes or factors for 
collaboration endurance for the JIC included trust and social capital.  After the Games the 
members of this unit capitalized on what they had spent years building.  According to one 
JIC member, “I think that a lot of times we have these little walls around us, or fences 
around us…a lot of those had already been torn down…because of relationships we had 
with each other.”104  Another interviewee said JIC members knew, “If there’s a major 
incident…we can all work together and help each other out.”105  Yet another leader said 
they were able to sustain the Olympic collaboration because “there were inter-
dependencies on a social level.  There was trust; there was companionship, esprit d’ corp.  
That group of people liked each other.”106 
(2)  Motivation.  During the kidnapping of teenager Elizabeth 
Smart, the Salt Lake City Police Department was overwhelmed with media inquiries.  
                                                 
104 Anonymous Local Law Enforcement Official B, interviewed by author on Oct. 25, 2007. 
105 Anonymous State Law Enforcement Official, interviewed by author on Sept. 25, 2007. 
106 Anonymous Local Law Enforcement Official B, interviewed by author on Sept. 21, 2007. 
 39
The story of her disappearance grabbed national headlines.  Hundreds of reporters and 
photographers converged on her neighborhood to cover the story.  One interviewee, who 
was assigned to the JIC during the Games, described how this incident created a felt need 
or motivation for collaboration endurance. “I was on scene by 6:45 [am]…a girl, a 13-
year old girl, who had been taken from her home…I was getting calls from CNN, 
[national news reporter] called on my cell phone.”107    
This collaborative effort was put in place to effectively manage the 
thousands of media phone calls and inquiries during the ongoing kidnapping 
investigation.  A local leader said,  
As you look at some of these things when you talk about the JIC and 
information sharing, some of the events that occurred, Elizabeth Smart 
was very timely and required a lot of input from a lot different people and 
so that brought a whole bunch of agencies together again that had 
practiced [together].108 
(3)  Leadership.  “Leadership in the JIC, I really like the fact that 
everyone kind of swallowed their egos and said, ‘What do we have to do to make this 
successful?’”109  This quote came from one of the interviewees who led the JIC during 
the Winter Olympics.  Other interviewees praised the fact that JIC collaboration endured 
for a time following the Games.  They credited strong leadership.  Two interviewees 
suggested that eventually lack of leadership and lack of planning became the reasons why 
it was no longer formally in place.  One state leader said the JIC needed leaders to keep it 
in their plans.  “I felt like [the] JIC was a like a religion, and we had to teach it and we 
had to spread it...I don’t know that the next leader felt as strongly about that as I did.  It’s 
like anything else, if you don’t keep stirring the pot it’s going to burn or it’s going to just 
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b. Intelligence Unit 
The second example of continuing post-Olympic collaboration endurance 
was the Intelligence Unit.   Before and during the Games, the Intelligence Unit comprised 
federal, state and local law enforcement agencies in addition to other disciplines.  The 
Intelligence Unit continued after the Games in the form of the Utah Criminal Intelligence 
Center (UCIC) and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).  The unit still operates today 
out of the local FBI office and has full-time and part-time analysts and investigators from 
several organizations.  The interviewees identified the following enablers of collaboration 
endurance for the Intelligence Unit: trust and social capital, motivation, and leadership. 
(1)  Trust and Social Capital.  A state leader described why he 
believed the Intelligence Unit endured:  “Because of what we had during the Games that 
trust allowed us to continue on and work together.”111  He added that social capital and 
relationships built during the Games helped keep it going.  Another top state leader spoke 
about having to build relationships to keep other organizations involved in intelligence 
gathering.  “At the state level, there was a huge effort in the intelligence area…keep those 
lines of communication open.…when you’re talking about intelligence once the 
Olympics were over, I had to rely an awful lot on social capital [that] was built and try to 
convince them…[to] participate.112  
(2)  Motivation.  Leaders identified motivational factors that they 
believed enabled collaboration endurance.  One local leader noted that there was a felt 
need to protect the public from criminal or violent activities.  The Winter Olympics may 
have ended, but the threat of domestic terrorism continued to exist.  A top leader from a 
federal law enforcement organization believed that collaborative success during the 
Games motivated the group to endure.  “There was no existence of Joint Terrorism Task 
Force (JTTF), there was no intelligence sharing.  As a result of the Olympics, I was able 
to bring the state into a joint ownership of an intelligence operation, the JTTF flourished, 
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we had collaborative investigations...it was a huge dividend from the Olympics, huge.”113   
Still, one local leader believed that the citizens in his area would expect nothing less in 
preventing terrorist-related activities after the Games.  Not participating or collaborating 
was not an option.  “The societal expectations wouldn’t let it happen.”114  
Finally, one local leader explained that he believed the Intelligence 
Unit endured because the federal government supported the local agencies after the 
Games.  “Well, I think the reason why INTEL, JTTF endured was the support of the 
FBI.”115  This support created a motivation for agencies to continue working together to 
protect Utah from any possible attacks.  Agencies felt that an enduring collaboration 
would keep them connected to the FBI, and important case information could be shared 
more effectively among the agencies. 
(3)  Leadership.  A local leader with more than thirty-three years 
experience said the decision to leave local officers in the federal JTTF unit was “[a] 
leadership decision by the respective agencies, and it was not a hard decision to make 
because we benefited from those things…there was no threat to anybody either…[but] 
people could see that they benefited from it.”116  Without leaderships’ commitment, the 
organizations would not have participated.  At times he said he had to convince his 
counterparts (leaders) to take part.  “I'll give you an example of that. … Going around the 
state trying to convince the sheriff's associations and the police chiefs to participate in an 
intelligence infrastructure and trying to get them to understand the need for them to 
belong.” 
Finally, a local leader commended the enduring effort, saying, 
“People deserve a lot of credit for whatever intelligence function remains.  It’s in 
leadership…in the task force, in which they are still having those very meetings”117 
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While the Intelligence Unit and JIC endured, at least to some 
degree, the question remains: Why did most of the Olympic collaborations not endure 
after the Games?   
3. Barriers/Challenges to Collaborations 
The leaders interviewed for this study addressed a number of barriers or 
challenges to collaboration.  They cited the absence of several of the key factors that had 
enabled effective collaboration during the Olympics.  One blamed the absence of support 
for continued collaboration, “If the leadership of any of the agencies in the Olympics 
wanted to keep this going, it would’ve kept going, but it didn’t.  When that goes away, 
people kind of go back to business.”  The senior local leader then talked about need: “It 
[collaboration] became less of a priority on a global scale…now you’re back to…day-to-
day operations.”118  Another respondent added, “The assets go away, the Olympics are 
over and the funding is gone, the crisis, gone.”119  These comments highlight some of the 
barriers and challenges to collaboration endurance. 
After conducting interviews with all twenty-two Olympic law enforcement 
leaders, the author noted the barriers and challenges to endurance that were most 
commonly addressed.  As shown in Figure 5, these barriers are divided into two 
categories: pre-Olympic and post-Olympic.  Figure 5 details the recurring themes the 
interviewees felt hindered collaborative efforts before the Olympics, and barriers to 
collaboration endurance.  In some cases, a barrier was the inverse or absence of an 
enabler.  For example, in Figure 3 trust was considered an enabler for collaboration; 
therefore, as shown in Figure 5, the absence of trust became a barrier.  Such was the case 
with other factors like leadership, strategic planning, felt need and mandated system. 
During the interviews it became clear that barriers or challenges that affected pre-
Olympic collaborations did not necessarily affect why collaborations did not endure.  For 
example, as shown in Figure 5, some leaders considered absence of trust to be a barrier or 
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challenge to collaborative efforts prior to the Olympics.  By the time the Olympics were 
over, however, trust had been effectively established and was not considered to be a 
significant factor for why collaborations did not endure.     
 
 
Figure 5.   Barriers and Challenges to Collaboration Endurance 
 
In this section, the author addresses the barriers or challenges to pre-
Olympic collaboration and discusses the barriers or challenges to post-Olympic 
collaboration endurance.  
a. Barriers / Challenges to Collaboration: Pre-Olympics   
When addressing pre-Olympic barriers to collaborations, it is important to 
note the interviewees perceived these barriers more as challenges.  These challenges 
needed to be addressed and overcome because they had the potential to disrupt or derail 
the collaborative endeavors.     
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Of the twenty-two law enforcement leaders interviewed for this study, 20 
percent felt political interference was a major challenge.  Ten percent saw absence of 
trust as a barrier or challenge, and 30 percent cited absence of social capital as a 
challenge.   These responses were based on the initial question of, “What do you think the 
biggest challenge or barriers to operating in collaboration were?”  However, when 
follow-up probing questions were asked, the percentage of interviewees who felt trust 
was a major challenge increased from 10 to 25 percent. When probing questions were 
asked about social capital, the percentage of respondents who named this as a challenge 
increased dramatically, from 25 to 70 percent.  Political interference remained the same. 
(1)  Absence of Social Capital.  The absence of social capital was 
considered to be the lack of loyal relationships between individuals or organizations 
working toward a common goal.  One top local official felt that the single biggest barrier 
to collaboration during the Winter Games was the inability to build social capital.120  
Another pointed out that during the extensive preparations for the Olympics that if 
individuals could not develop strong levels of social capital, effective operations could 
not occur.121     
For example, social capital clearly was lacking when a federal 
agency attempted to prohibit the use of an important transportation route during a critical 
time of the Winter Olympics.  A leading state official described how millions of dollars 
had been put forth to develop a transportation route to an Olympic venue.  State and local 
public safety leaders had not developed enough social capital with a small number of 
their federal counterparts who wanted to close the route.  Because of this, several tense 
meetings took place.  The road eventually was reopened. The state leader believed that 
the tense meetings could have been prevented if social capital had been established. 122 
Another case highlighted what happened in the absence of social 
capital.  A federal organization brought in a planner to work with the local agencies.  
According to one interviewee, there was no attempt by the federal agent to build 
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relationships with the other members of the group. This person continued to “bump heads 
with the locals” during the planning process.  Although the federal agent was very 
capable, the planning process was impeded, and as a result he was removed and 
replaced.123   
When addressing the absence of social capital as a barrier to 
collaboration, one senior local official spoke of how he recognized this challenge and 
how he addressed it.  Although he worked for a different organization, he met with the 
Salt Lake City Police Department daily before the Olympics began.  He explained, “I 
would go over to the city everyday…and stand in one of their roll calls, just kind of hang 
out, introduce myself and meet some people.” He believed the time he spent building 
loyal relationships was a principal aspect to being successful.  Conversely, when people 
did not address this barrier, collaboration was impeded.124 
(2)  Absence of Trust.  The absence of trust was defined as being 
suspicious of others, “their integrity, their agenda, their capabilities or their track record.” 
In other words, there is a complete lack of confidence in another’s abilities.125  As stated 
above, 25 percent of the interviewees said the absence of trust became a barrier.  One 
state leader said, “One of the things that I noticed was less trust.  Those of us [who] had 
worked together…we became friends.  Bottom line, we became good friends and still are 
today.  Whereas the ones [who] came in just barely before or during the Olympics had 
less trust in everyone involved.”126           
Another senior state leader noted how the absence of trust became 
a barrier during initial intelligence gathering.  During the early planning stage, there were 
several federal and state agencies conducting their own intelligence operations and not 
comparing or sharing information.  This became a barrier to effective intelligence and 
thorough investigations before the Games.  As the Games grew closer, there was a need  
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to establish a de-confliction process to address the absence of trust.  By coming together, 
the leader noted, critical information was shared and the safety and security of the Games 
was enhanced.  
Finally, one state leader said, “You built relationships that have 
been built over time…those were huge, and I'll give you specific example... We’d been at 
it for a couple of years, and then the Secret Service came forward and they wanted to 
offer two thousand agents… [The agent had] never been there before, nobody knew him 
and he wasn’t an insider but he was the Secret Service’s representative for the Olympic 
Games…I mean there wasn’t that trust, there was no social capital…he had not invested 
anything into building something before he came in and made that kind of an offer.”127  
According to the interviewee, the Secret Service representative continued to have 
difficulties building trust and social capital during the Games.  
(3)  Political Interference.  According to the subjects, political 
interference came from several different levels. Some said political interference came 
from law enforcement executives.  Others felt it came directly from politicians such as 
mayors and top elected officials.  One state leader described such interference as 
challenging.  He said, “I think our biggest barrier…the mayor, the governor, whoever, it 
wasn’t just one politician.  We had our system and the system worked great but when the 
politicians got involved…I don’t know that they understood what had happened or what 
was going on.”128  Politicians at times would interfere in the collaborative system for 
various reasons, and consequently the efforts seemed to falter for a time. “They 
[politicians] want to be the ones [who] are out there. They want to be the ones [who] are 
the saviors for everything.”  The local leader went on to say that political factors can 
scuttle good collaborative efforts.   
Four of the twenty-two interviewees said they felt certain public 
safety leaders had political agendas, and those agendas interfered with the ability to 
collaborate resources effectively.  One top state leader said, “There is so much political 
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minutia that’s involved when you try to get these high level people together to make a 
decision… You always saw the maneuvering going on.”129  
One of the local leaders used the example of an Olympic 
commander, who was operating under his own political agenda.  The leader said, “We 
have a commander over our effort, local agency commander, who has another 
agenda…he wants to get promoted, so he wants to appease the guy that’s going to 
promote him, so he feeds the resources that he’s committed to UOPSC to [his boss 
instead].”130 
b. Barriers / Challenges to Collaboration Endurance: Post-
Olympics 
The 2002 Winter Olympics ended on February 24, 2002.  After seven 
years of successful and enduring collaboration for the Games, the majority of the 
Olympic collaborations ended. The interviewees talked about why they felt collaboration 
endurance faltered after the Games.  The factors most often cited as barriers to post-
Olympic collaboration are outlined in Figure 5.  These barriers include lack of felt need, 
lack of leadership, the lack of strategic planning and the absence of a mandated system.  
The majority, 81 percent of the leaders, indicated that when the Olympics ended so too 
did the felt need.  Sixty-four percent of interviewees pointed to the lack of a mandated 
system.  Forty-five percent blamed lack of leadership. Forty-one percent said the lack of 
strategic planning was a barrier to collaboration endurance.  It is important to note that 
when they addressed post-Olympic endurance, the leaders defined barriers, not as 
challenges that needed to be overcome but as the reason why collaborative efforts did not 
endure. 
(1)  Lack of Motivation / Felt Need.  Most of the interviewed 
leaders said the lack of felt need for a collaborative effort produced the most significant 
barrier to endurance after the Games.  When addressing felt need, interviewees said there 
was no longer a need to be interdependent because the Games were over.  One federal 
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official pointed out that agencies justified their decision to discontinue collaboration 
because there was no viable or direct threat against Salt Lake City.  Four senior local 
officials added that the felt need to collaborate was more nebulous following the Games.  
Local organizations were no longer being pushed from behind by vulnerability and fear 
of terrorist attacks.  Instead, leaders had to pull from the front to keep the collaboration 
going.  In other words, because there was no “perceived risk or threat” once the Olympics 
were over, leaders had to be motivated to find a need or reason to keep collaborative 
efforts in place.131  But leaders were torn because they also had to get their own 
organizations back to their day-to-day operations.132  The general sense among several 
interviewees was that individual organizations realized they had to take care of 
themselves and protect the jurisdiction for which they were responsible. 
A local top official with twenty-five years experience offered his 
perspective, saying that law enforcement agencies planned for major events, such as 
earthquakes, floods or other disasters, yet these disasters are not a priority until such an 
event occurs. Because the need to protect and secure the Games was no longer necessary, 
collaboration was not a priority.  
(2)  No Mandated System.   Sixty-four percent of the respondents 
suggested that with no formal or mandated system in place after the Olympics, 
collaborations were bound to end.  They were referring to a system similar to the one that 
was mandated through legislation for public safety agencies to collaborate prior to the 
Olympics.   A state leader described why he believed organizations did not keep the 
collaborative efforts going after the Games: “I'll participate with the state when it benefits 
me and right now, it doesn’t benefit me.”133  He indicated that because he was not 
mandated to collaborate, he did not see a reason to do so at that time. 
Some of the leaders suggested that the lack of legislative mandates 
resulted in the lack of a system to support collaboration endurance.  In the case of the 
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2002 Winter Olympics, the legislation that mandated collaboration during the Games 
expired once the Games ended.  One local leader said, “To make it endure, yeah, you are 
going to have to create a system.”   He added that, “anything short of legislation or 
mandating it” would not be enough to ensure collaboration endurance.  
(3)  Lack of Leadership.  Just under half of the leaders interviewed 
for this study identified lack of leadership as a barrier to post-Olympic collaboration 
endurance.  One local executive explained why he thought this happened.  He said 
leaders went from having deadlines to meet collaborative goals to having to “be self-
motivated” in continuing collaborations.134  He explained how, as a leader, one could talk 
oneself out of collaboration.  “God it’s expensive, and Jesus it’s liability prone, and my 
God what’s the real need?  You can talk yourself out of it in about 30 seconds.”135   
Several leaders remembered having discussions with key federal, 
state and local leaders about the endurance of collaborative efforts.  One senior local 
leader said there were discussions about keeping collaborations going after the Games.  
The lack of leadership was an influence because at the end of the day, people who were 
in charge were the ones who made the decisions with regard to agency business.136  The 
lack of leadership filtered down to the frontline officers with regard to breaking down 
collaborative efforts.137  
One leader said his counterparts had to re-examine where they 
wanted to spend their money, and that what “gets measured today, gets done.”  He added, 
“That’s a short-sighted viewpoint, but that happens in organizations, and where you end 
up with somebody just saying, just bag this.  If I’m the lieutenant or sergeant on the 
squad, if it’s not important to them and they aren’t going to fund it, what am I supposed 
to do?”138  Another interviewee explained that when leadership fails to have a vision and 
a plan, chances are the current endeavor will stop.  A state leader said, “Instead of 
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planning just for the Olympics plan…where do we want to be five [years] after the 
Olympics…make that very straight-forward…so they know the day after the Olympics 
what direction they’re headed in. That was not done.”139  
(4)  Lack of Strategic Planning.  One local leader believed that the 
Olympic public safety planning group did not have a vision of how its experience could 
be utilized to benefit the entire community after the event.  Several local and state leaders 
said that instead of only planning for the Olympics; additional plans should have been in 
place to continue some of the viable collaborative efforts five to 10 years after the 
Olympics.  
One local leader attributed this lack of strategic attention to key 
players and leaders involved in the Winter Olympics being transferred, promoted or 
retiring after the Games.  This changed some of the organizations’ leadership and hurt 
chances for strategic planning.  One leader said that despite informal plans and 
discussions about collaboration endurance, within a short time following the Games, 
these plans and the units “just fell apart.”  He added, “It was just like a plant that didn’t 
get water. It eventually just died… Nobody stayed on top of it.  There was no plan, post-
Olympic, on what we were going to do with this resource.”140  This was reinforced by 
another local leader, who stated that these units “died on the vine” due to changes in 
leadership and shifting priorities.  Despite the best intentions, the collaborations were set 
aside in favor of whatever “squeaking wheel” needed the grease.141  
4. Summary 
The results of the interviews with twenty-two law enforcement leaders suggested 
that collaboration endurance was a concern for most of the respondents in this study.  
During the interviews a number of themes emerged that may help explain why some 
collaborative efforts endured following the 2002 Winter Olympics, but why most did not.  
Key factors considered to be enablers to pre-Olympic collaboration included motivation 
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or felt need, leadership, trust and mandated systems.  Within two of the key enablers – 
motivation and leadership – there were sub-themes that also were identified.  According 
to the subjects, these sub-themes, such as strategic planning and interdependence, also 
influenced organizations to collaborate during the Games.   
If these enablers remained present after the Games, the interviewees believed 
there would have been a greater likelihood of collaboration endurance.  However, the 
interviews revealed that these enablers typically were absent after the Games, and all but 
two of the collaborative efforts ended immediately following the 2002 Winter Olympics.   
While the subjects identified three barriers to collaborative efforts before the 
Games, they saw these barriers more as challenges that needed to be overcome.  These 
barriers or challenges included the absence of social capital and trust, and political 
interference.  On the other hand, the respondents saw the key barriers to post-Olympic 
collaboration as the reasons why collaborations ended.  These barriers included lack of 
motivation or felt need, lack of a mandated or formalized system, lack of leadership and 
lack of strategic planning.  In some cases, the barriers that emerged during the interviews 
were the inverse of what these interviewees considered to be enablers for collaboration.  
For example, while leadership was considered to be a strong enabler for collaboration 
before the Olympics, the lack of leadership emerged as a barrier to collaboration 
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V. DISCUSSION 
A. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS   
This thesis was designed to address the question:  What factors explain why some 
of the successful collaborations used during the 2002 Winter Olympics endured and some 
did not?  This chapter discusses the study’s findings and their implications as they relate 
to the literature.  The interview results from the twenty-two law enforcement leaders 
generally support the review in Chapter II.  
According to the Bureau of Justice Assistance, multi-organizational operations or 
collaboration tend to benefit critical stakeholders, especially in the law enforcement field. 
This is true because criminal activities tend to cross jurisdictional boundaries.142  The 
interviewees in this study addressed a variety of questions regarding factors and barriers 
to collaboration — including what they believed to be barriers to collaboration endurance 
following the 2002 Winter Olympics.  The interviewees believed that four key enablers 
enhanced collaborative efforts before and during the 2002 Winter Olympics.  According 
to the respondents, these enablers included trust and social capital, motivation or felt 
need, leadership, and a mandated system.  Some of these enablers were also factors for 
the two collaborative efforts that endured after the Games.  The barriers or challenges to 
collaboration endurance included the lack of a mandated system, lack of trust and social 
capital, lack of leadership, and lack of felt need. 
1. Felt Need 
The understanding and appreciation for interdependence before the Games was 
high. Once the Olympics were over, however, that felt need disappeared and became a 
barrier to collaboration endurance.  This occurred after the Games, when organizations 
and individuals focused more on their own needs; they did not see the broader vision of 
what collaboration endurance could do for the community.  Hocevar et al. found felt need 
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to be a highly important factor in collaborative capacity; the findings of the current 
research reinforce this premise.143  A federal report found that agencies or organizations 
that want to collaborate must have a convincing reason to do so.  Whether it is through a 
crisis situation or “imposed externally through legislation,” there must be a benefit to all 
stakeholders involved if they are to be interdependent with each other.144   The findings 
in this study suggest collaborations cannot be sustained over long periods of time based 
solely on the possibility of future emergency situations, however, unless other 
collaborative factors/enablers are present.  
2. Leadership 
Leaders are an important factor in enduring collaborations for several reasons: 
They identify important collaborative endeavors, they can motivate their organizations, 
and they are responsible for outlining a strategic plan.  Leadership is also a key enabler 
because leaders can assign the right people to tasks.  After the 2002 Olympics, leaders 
appeared to redirect their efforts.  Leaders returned to their organizations and were able to 
talk themselves out of spending resources to continue collaborations.  With leadership no 
longer committed to, or supporting, collaborative efforts, those efforts stopped.  
Leadership has the power to direct resources and develop relationships with other 
organizations to enhance enduring collaborations.145  A 2005 GAO report on enhancing 
and sustaining collaborations stated that leaders involved in collaborations need to have 
commitment, not only at their level, but throughout their organization, so they can 
breakdown barriers while working in multi-organizational capacities.  Leadership at all 
levels must be committed to collaborative efforts for success to occur.146  Hocevar et al.  
indicated that leadership takes on a more important role when “institutional mechanisms” 
are not in place.147  In the absence of leadership, collaboration endurance began to 
decline following the Olympics.   
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3. Trust and Social Capital 
Building high levels of trust and social capital was necessary so that important 
decisions could be made and executed before and during the Games.  Additionally, when 
participants did not feel threatened by other collaborative partners, the potential for 
collaboration endurance was likely to increase.  If stakeholders were not concerned that 
others could use the “opportunity to exploit,” then a more productive interaction 
occurred.  Trust is a key component in overcoming suspicion toward other individuals 
and organizations that are working together.148  Several of the collaborative efforts 
during the Games, mentioned by the interviewees, were successful because of the trust 
and social capital that were built.  Hocevar et al. stated in their study that “lateral 
mechanisms” such as social capital were “frequently mentioned as contributing to 
success” in collaboration.149    
The interviewed subjects indicated that trust and social capital were perceived as 
challenges before the Games.  Interestingly, these two factors were not seen by the 
respondents as the explanation for the lack of post-Olympic collaboration endurance.  
Interviewees agreed that trust and social capital had been built among law enforcement 
leaders during the planning and execution phases of the Olympics.  In the literature, trust 
and social capital are considered to be factors that help facilitate bringing people 
together.150  The Office for Domestic Preparedness in 2003 published guidelines for the 
prevention and deterrence of terrorism.  In its recommendations, trust and social capital 
in collaborative efforts were marked as important.151  It appears that the groundwork for 
trust and social capital had been established during the Olympic collaboration and could 
have been an enabler for collaboration endurance. Because of other factors, however, this 
collaborative capacity was not entirely capitalized on after the Games. 
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Another way to develop and maintain the needed trust and social capital is to have 
a history of previous multi-agency collaborative efforts.152  It could be argued that a 
“history” was established during the Winter Games.  Although the findings indicate some 
interviewees did not think a history of partnership enhanced collaboration, many believed 
it did.  By having some type of collaborative history, the necessary social capital and trust 
already may have been developed.  By continuously working and training together, 
planning and even socializing, leaders and personnel were able to build the necessary 
relationships and trust that then allowed the collaborative mission to be accomplished.153 
Because stakeholders involved in inter-organizational collaboration typically come from 
different backgrounds, education and experience, it is important to realize that trust and 
social capital are imperative when building a connection between groups.   
4. Mandated System  
A collaborative system was created, based on an initial mandate, for the 2002 
Winter Olympics.  The system defined roles and responsibilities for the organizations 
involved.  This legislative mandate was implemented several years before the Games, and 
it allowed key leaders time to modify and refine the operational plan.  The system created 
a mechanism that enabled resources to be used in a sensible and productive manner.154  
The structure created by mandated systems legitimizes an understanding that the overall 
inter-organizational mission is more important than individual organizational goals and 
objectives.  
Key stakeholders were able to find common objectives and design a system that 
established accountabilities through collaboration.  Some leaders in this study preferred 
to build such a system without a legislative mandate.  However, other critical factors or 
enablers for collaboration must be present.  For example, if internal motivation or felt 
need is adequate, a mandated system may not be necessary.  Whether collaborations can 
be sufficiently motivated by acknowledged need and perceived benefit is a question this 
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thesis leaves unanswered.  The findings of this study, however, indicated that in the 
absence of a system of formalized roles and procedures, most collaborative efforts did not 
endure after 2002 Winter Olympics. 
B. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
To accomplish collaboration endurance, this study supports other research in 
recommending that organizations focus on critical enablers such as motivation and felt 
need, trust and social capital, and leadership.  Based on these findings, a model is 
presented based on three key enablers: trust, leadership and felt need.  The model 
proposes a compensatory relationship among enablers of collaboration.  The 
compensatory aspect of the model resonates with Steven Kerr and John Jermier’s concept 
of substitutes for leadership.  Kerr and Jermier’s substitutes for leadership model argues 
that  other characteristics can be substituted or compensate for the lack of leadership, 
which can, of course, be extremely helpful when leadership qualities are low or absent.155  
This study hypothesizes a similar “substitutes” or compensatory approach to using 
various enablers of collaboration.156   
It would seem obvious that the ideal pattern for collaboration endurance is for 
leadership, trust and need all to be at high levels.  However, enablers for collaboration are 
likely to be less than ideal.  Three possible patterns, albeit not the only ones that might 
characterize the system, are described below.  As shown in Figure 6, the first pattern 
places felt need at a higher level than trust and leadership.  The second pattern illustrates 
that when need and trust are at lower levels, a higher level of leadership is necessary.  
The third pattern illustrates trust at a higher level because leadership and felt need are at 
lower levels.  Finally, the author suggests trust and leadership as a compensatory 
approach to collaboration endurance.   
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1. Felt Need Pattern as a Primary Factor for Generating and Sustaining 
Collaboration 
In the first pattern in Figure 6, felt need is at an elevated level, while other factors 
such as leadership and trust are at lower levels.  For example, during emergencies, crisis 
incidents or even critical events like the Winter Olympics, the felt need factor is high.  As 
shown in Figure 6, when felt need is high, collaboration may be hypothesized to function 









   
   
   
   
   
   
   





Figure 6.   Felt Need Pattern 
Although factors such as trust or leadership are at lower levels, effective 
collaboration could still occur.  Felt need might well substitute for the other enablers 
during collaboration.  Based on the findings, the author believes that during critical 
events, missions and goals can be accomplished between different organizations even if 
they have not developed trust or social capital.  This pattern suggests that collaboration 
can be successful even if leadership has not adequately planned for the event.  
Conversely, when an immediate, pressing need or motivation is lower, then enablers such 
as leadership and trust should be higher.  It also is hypothesized that high need 
collaborations will not endure unless other enablers or factors, such as leadership and 
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trust, are raised.  Swift trust may well be developed during these types of events.  The 
critical event may allow trust to be built quickly between organizations or individuals.157    
2. Leadership as a Primary Factor for Generating and Sustaining 
Collaboration  
As the findings in this study suggest, leadership and strategic planning are critical 
enablers in collaborative success.  The commitment of leadership becomes especially 
important when enablers such as motivation or felt need are low.  This is illustrated 
Figure 7.   In this pattern, trust is lower but leadership is elevated.  Because felt need is 
not high, individuals or organizations may not be motivated to collaborate.  In this pattern 
leaders should make a commitment to collaborate.  Leadership is critical to collaboration 
endurance especially when felt need is low and may not rise until a critical event or an 










   
   
   
   
   
   
   





Figure 7.   Leadership Pattern 
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3. Trust as a Primary Factor for Generating and Sustaining 
Collaboration  
Figure 8 illustrates a condition in which trust is relatively high.  This pattern 
hypothesizes that trust can enable collaboration when felt need and leadership are at 
lower levels.  This pattern would suggest that trust could be substituted for felt need and 










   
   
   
   
   
   
   





Figure 8.   Trust Pattern 
 
Trust was considered to be an important enabler for post-Olympic collaboration 
endurance.  For example, trust was a factor for the continuation of the Olympic 
Intelligence Unit and the Joint Information Center.  Interviewees from both units 
acknowledged that the trust built during the Games created an environment that allowed 
their efforts to go on.   
Although trust may help to sustain collaboration endurance to some extent, it may 
not provide the proper direction to accomplish a mission or goal.  Therefore, trust may 
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act as a temporary substitute, and is hypothesized not to provide the same capacity to 
support collaboration as leadership or felt need. If leadership or felt need is not 
reintroduced into a collaboration, trust may, in fact, dissipate, leaving the participants to 
operate independent of each other. This could produce a potential for a collaborative 
effort to dissolve.  
4. Trust and Leadership Compensatory Approach Post-Olympics   
To maintain collaboration endurance after the Winter Olympics, leadership and 
trust factors should have been sustained at increased levels. The author suggests this 
because “felt need” dissipated and would have remained low until a critical event or an 
emergency occurred.  In Utah, trust and leadership could have compensated for a lower 
level of felt need after the Games.  If leadership and trust can be maintained at elevated 
levels, the suggested ideal situation would be to raise the felt need so all factors are high. 









   
   
   
   
   
   
   





Figure 9.   Trust and Leadership Compensated for Low Felt Need  
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Raising the level of need for an enduring collaboration should not require a 
significant event.  Leaders can analyze trends, determine possible terrorist actions, and 
evaluate the likelihood of critical incidents to verify if a higher felt need exists.   
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Many agencies in the law enforcement field tend to operate independently. 
Mutual aid and interagency coordination is something that occurs during times of crisis. 
When a major incident takes place, without question, there will be a need for multiple 
public safety organizations to come together and combine their limited resources.158 
Studies and research of how to better collaborate, especially in finding ways for 
collaboration to endure, are important to the future of homeland defense and security.   
To date, limited research has focused on the endurance of collaborations 
involving homeland security and public safety organizations.  The study reported here 
begins to answer some of the questions as to why collaborations endure.  In particular, 
the proposed model of how factors may compensate for each other in enabling 
collaboration is another important area for further research.  Thus, an important 
opportunity for research continues.  Factors needing further study are those that can help 
to enhance the ability of public safety organizations to work more effectively to deter, 
prevent, prepare and respond to critical incidents, and to keep our homeland safe.  Further 
research should focus on discovering how to develop a robust collaboration, and then to 
find a means to continue the collaboration after the initial need is gone. 
D. CONCLUSION 
If collaborations are to endure, barriers to collaboration need to be broken down, 
removed, and replaced with enablers.  If barriers continue to stand in the way of 
collaborative efforts, more of these efforts may continue to falter.  Law enforcement  
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leaders dedicated years to building strong and successful collaborations for the Olympics.  
These efforts were hailed as a huge success.  Once the Olympics ended, however, so did 
almost all of these successful collaborations.  
This thesis set out to discover why collaborations set up during the 2002 Winter 
Olympics either endured or ended, and what factors help to explain this.  Enablers, such 
as motivation and felt need, leadership, strategic planning and a formal or mandated 
system of roles and procedures, were lacking.  The findings of this study suggested this is 
why most of the Olympic collaborations did not endure.   
Is there hope to resurrect any of the collaborations that ended after the Games?  
One positive aspect in Utah is that interviewees indicated that trust and social capital still 
exist among several of the law enforcement leaders who were assigned to the Games.   
Other enablers, however, such as leadership, strategic planning and, potentially, some 
type of mandated system should be considered.    
While the pressing needs of the Olympics are past, scenarios can be identified to 
reinforce the needs and benefits of collaboration.  The need for an enduring collaboration 
should not require a major event, such as the Olympics.  Law enforcement leaders can 
analyze crime statistics and trends, terrorist activity, and the potential for natural or man-
made critical incidents to determine a higher felt need. 
The 2002 Winter Olympics provided some remarkable examples of collaboration.  
The Games also demonstrated how quickly collaboration can end.  While this study may 
not offer an exact blueprint for why this happened, it does reveal important factors that 
law enforcement organizations should consider to create a greater potential for 
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This interview is part of a thesis for a MA at NPS.  I need your permission to tape 
record this interview.  All the information gathered from this or any other sources will 
be maintained as confidential.  In this thesis or any other documentation, no names 
will be used.  All information will be aggregated and summary themes derived.   If you 
are quoted in the thesis, it will be presented as anonymous.  If the nature of the quote 
could disclose your identity, permission will be requested before I use it.  This interview 
will last about one hour.  I am looking for a retrospective view of how inter-
organizational collaboration occurred during the Winter Olympics.   I am interested in 
identifying the factors that influenced collaborative efforts among public safety 
agencies.  I am also interested in why some collaborative units either endured or did 
not endure after the Games.  I would like examples of any first hand or general 
knowledge you may have with regard to collaborations during the Games.   
Do you have any questions? 
 
 
Retrospectively, During the Olympics  
 
NOTE: Ask them to keep specific collaborations in mind when answering these 
questions and to give specific examples.  If the factor varied in different 
collaborations, ask them to explain (e.g., leadership may have been important in 
one collaborative unit but felt need may have been a stronger driver in another). 
 
During the 2002 Winter Olympics, what factors do you believe helped establish the inter-
agency or inter-organizational collaborative efforts?    
 
Which Olympic collaborative efforts do you have a first hand knowledge of? 
• Which collaborative efforts or Olympic units do you have a general 
knowledge of? 
 
In your view, was collaboration successful during the Games?  
• What were the factors that contributed to collaboration success?  (specific 
factors and specific examples or illustrations) 
 
Literature tells us some of the following factors are important with regard to 
collaboration.  Please give specific examples if the following factors were important to 












Interpersonal communication (people skills) 
 
Shared problem solving 
Formal control (decision making) 




PROBE / Ticklers 
 
Were there incentives ($, economy of scale, effectiveness, cost saving) to 
participating in collaboration during the Games?   
• What were they? 
• Were there disincentives?  What were they? 
 
Did leadership play a role with regard to collaboration? 
• If so, in what way? 
• If not, how was this evident? 
 
Did having a history of partnerships or cooperative efforts prior to the Olympics 
assist in developing/maintaining collaborative effort?  
• Who were they with? 
• How did this effect operation? 
 
What was the biggest motivation for collaborating during the Olympics? 
• Was there a ‘felt need’ to participate? 
• Was there a cost / benefit aspect? 
  
What aspects did you think had the most influence to the success of collaboration 
during the Olympics? 
• Was social capital important?  Why? 
• Was trust important?  Why?  
• Was interpersonal communication (people skills) important?  Why? 
• Was shared problem solving a factor?  Why? 
• Was control important?  Why?  
 
What do you see as the value of collaboration during the Games? 
• How did your organization benefit during the Games? 
• Do those benefits still exist? 
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During the Games, what were there barriers or biggest challenges to operating in 
collaborative effort? 
  
What was the plan for collaboration once the Games were over? 
 
After the Olympics  
 
In these next questions, we will consider collaborations that did endure and those that 
did not.  I would like to understand what factors you think explain why some continued 
and others did not.   To start, are there any examples for which collaborative units 
could have been used after the Winter Olympics and were not? 
Expand? 
 
What factors do you believe help explain why some collaborative units continued and 
some did not?    
o What was the impact of leadership? 
o Were there barriers created?  What were they?  
o Were there differences in the perceived need for these units?  Was the 
assessment of need accurate? 
 
Again, literature tells us the following factors are important to collaboration.  Were any 
the following a factor in effecting an Olympic collaborative unit continuing (enduring)?  
Were any the following a factor in effecting an Olympic collaborative unit not continuing 
(enduring)? 
Please give specific examples (Oly units, you were involved with/general/ specific from 











Interpersonal communication (people skills) 
 
Shared problem solving 
Formal control (decision making) 






PROBE / Ticklers 
 
To what extend does interdependence needed for these collaborations to endure? 
(i.e., success of my agency depends on w another agency). 
 
Were the incentives ($, economy of scale, effectiveness, cost saving) to 
participating in the collaboration after the Games?   
• Were there disincentives?  What were they? 
 
Did leadership play a role?  
• If so, in what way? 
• If not, how was this evident? 
 
What was the biggest motivation for continuing with collaboration or not after the 
Olympics? 
• Was the ‘felt need’ present? 
• Were the benefits present? 
o What were they? 
o What was missing? 
 
Do you think any of the following had an impact on whether a collaborative unit 
continued after the Games or stopped? 
• Social capital? 
• Trust? 
• Cost / Benefit (funding) aspect? 
• Interpersonal communication (people skills)? 
• Shared problem solving? 
o Can you give an example if applicable?  
 
Did formal control decision making have an impact on the collaboration 
continuing? 
• What role do you think individual agency control had on endurance? 
 
What role did strategic planning have on the collaboration continuing or ending? 
• Was there a lack of strategic planning? 
 
Finally, is there anything I need to know or something you would like to say 
concerning what could/should be done to encourage maintaining or re-engaging 
collaborations?  Also, what factors explain why some collaboration endures and 
others do not?   
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